Evaluation criterias for trust management in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) by Alriyami, Qasim et al.
Evaluation Criterias for Trust Management in
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET)
Qasim Alriyami and Asma Adnane and Anthony Kim Smith
School of computing and mathematics
University of Derby
Derby, UK
Email : q.alriyami1, a.adnane , a.k.smith @derby.ac.uk
Abstract—Vehicular Ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have been
around for a short time with a very promising future ahead.
VANETs are one of the ad hoc networks real-life applications,
where vehicles communicate which each other and with fixed
components known as roadside units. VANETs have their unique
characteristics and requirements which differ from those in
standard ad-hoc networks, but the security remains a major
challenge because of the very dynamic topology and the lack
of infrastructure. In this autonomous and auto-organized envi-
ronment, the question of whom to trust and for what become
very important and difficult to answer. This paper addresses the
issues associated with establishing trust between peers in VANET.
It defines, discusses and evaluates various trust management
approaches and how they address VANET requirements. The
paper also proposes criterias for assessing the effectiveness of
trust management models with regards to challenges specific to
VANETs.
I. INTRODUCTION
VANETs are a subset of ad-hoc networks and share many
advantages and challenges with other types of similar networks
such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) and Wireless
sensor networks (WSN). VANETs have two main components:
vehicles with wireless communication capabilities, and Road
Side Units (RSUs). The road side units form the VANET
infrastructure, they can be generally found in service stations,
traffic lights and selected points along the road side [8].
VANETs are designed to facilitate Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
and vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communications.
There are many applications for VANET such as increasing
road safety, and driver luxury. Parno & Perrig have presented
a safety application called ”Crash Avoidance” [1]. This ap-
plication is based on sharing information about the current
road conditions and congestions. In fact, it is estimated in one
year that 630,000 crashes in the United States are caused by
sudden lane changes or merges, which can be prevented if
cars can communicate their location information with other
vehicles [1]. Other applications for VANETs are dedicated to
the comfort of the driver such as the ability to access the
internet, multimedia and social networking websites [2]. All
these applications suffer classic network security challenges
as well as challenges inherited from ad-hoc networks.
Many research projects have been conducted on VANET
security among other concerns such as routing and Quality
of Service (QoS). VANETs are vulnerable to many insiders
and outsider attacks because of their open nature. Trust has
been considered as the key element in these networks, where
nodes do not rely on any centralised administration, and they
have to cooperate and work together in order to maintain the
network services. Each node need a certain level of knowledge
about the willingness and the availability of the other nodes in
performing correctly a certain action in certain circumstances.
This knowledge is called trust. Yet, in the literature, there is
no consensus on the definition of trust. As a result, a multitude
of formal models for trust calculation and management have
emerged. However, this also leads to a certain conceptual
confusion indicated by the fact that similar concepts appear
under different names and reciprocally.
The concept of ad-hoc networks has emerged very quickly,
and many trust models have been designed to ensure two
important requirements for the good functioning of these
networks which are cooperation and security. Indeed, the
cooperation enforcement protocols ensure that all the system
entities are cooperating [3], and the security protocols ensure
that only authorised entities are in the system, and their
communications are secured [4].
However, the lack of fixed infrastructure and the dynamic
topology make the cooperation between nodes in ad-hoc
networks harder to establish than in conventional networks.
Indeed, security solutions for these networks must be based
on distributed, auto-organised and cooperation enforcement
mechanisms [5]. The cooperation between nodes of ad hoc
network is a major challenge, because routing and securing
control messages in any ad hoc network require the cooper-
ation between all the network nodes. In fact, many security
attacks originate due to the selfishness of some nodes that try
to use the resources of the network for their own benefits [6].
Trust management is than very crucial because nodes acting on
false information from untrusted peers may lead to catastrophic
results [7].
In addition, VANETs have special requirements such as
the rapid mobility and delay intolerant which require different
security approaches than those adopted in the other ad-hoc
networks. For example, Users’ privacy must be ensured, in
order to encourage users to join VANET networks while
protecting their identities from being traced at the same time.
However, establishing trust between vehicles while keeping
the identity of the driver anonymous is another major chal-
lenge in VANETs. This paper investigates the issues of trust
management, and proposes some criteria for evaluating trust
models for VANET. The paper is organised as follow: section
2 presents trust theories. Section 3 highlights the challenges
associated with securing VANETs. While, section 4 examines
previous work proposed in the area. Section 5 concludes the
paper by introducing the benchmark or evaluation criteria for
trust management.
II. TRUST THEORIES
The study of the formalization of trust as an automated
concept was first introduced two decades ago by Stephen Paul
Marsh [11]. Marsh is considered a pioneer in the subject of
trust in intelligent systems, he argued that artificial agents
should have the capability to make sensible and informed deci-
sions on who is and who isn’t trustworthy. His novel idea was
to allow intelligent systems to make informed decisions relying
entirely on information presented in a particular situation. This
means that trust is an impeded feature in smart agents to allow
informed decisions based on available information. Further
to his studies on the formalisation of trust, Marsh conducted
further research with Briggs on the different flavours of trust
[12] . They argued that trust is not a simple dual sided concept
but it is rather a complex one. In theory the smart agent can
simply decide to trust or not trust another agent. But in reality,
the most likely decision would be to trust the other agent to
some degree and decide where to go from there in a concept
referred to as ”initializing trust”.
Most of security trust-based solutions focus on reputation
and recommendation models, which are commonly used for
example in e-commerce applications and cloud computing
[13], [14]. The implementation of these models is based on
a central trusted entity (e.g. Certificate Authority). This entity
will have the authority to supervise the behaviour/transactions
of any participant (in the system or network), and evaluate him
with a reputation value. A participant reputation will help the
other participants to decide whether or not to cooperate with
him and trust the data he provides. As only the trusted authority
is able to provide this reputation, all the anticipants will trust it
and take it as a valid information without any verification. In ad
hoc networks, these authorities are not an option because they
do not exist at all times. Trust solutions for MANETs are the
basis for all similar research in VANETs, even though models
cannot be directly applied to the later. One of the challenges
is that trust models in MANET make the assumption that trust
is available before a route is established between two nodes
[7].
Other challenges for trust management in VANETs as
highlighted by [7] and [8] include verifying trust data in real-
time. Nodes are required to act on information about accidents
and road conditions immediately any delay may render the
information useless. Nodes in congested metropolitan areas
have to process a large number of messages which could be
an overwhelming task. VANETs are exposed to sophisticated
false identity attacks such as Black-hole and Sybil attacks
which makes establishing trust harder in the presence of
malicious nodes. Finally, revealing the real identity of drivers
can compromise their privacy which means establishing trust
should not be based on information about the driver. Any
trust management proposal should take all these issues in
consideration and find a solution suited for VANETs. In this
paper, we will be studying all these issues and their impact on
establishing trust in VANET.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF VANET
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of today’s VANET
applications is largely towards satisfying the drivers’ desires
for a safe and comfortable journey. These applications rely
on the availability of road side units and the cooperation of
other vehicles on the road. Information exchanged between
vehicles should be secured from malicious nodes that try to
attack these networks because of their open wireless nature.
This makes integrity the most important security aspect in
VANETs [13]. Information received from malicious untrusted
nodes could harm the network operations. To understand how
to secure these networks, we need first to see what makes
them distinctive and vulnerable. VANETs have their unique
properties when compared to other ad-hoc networks [6] [8].
These are the source of several security concerns in VANETs
but are not of major burden in other ad-hoc networks.
A. Decentralized open systems
The purpose of VANET is to establish connection between
nodes without the permanent need for fixed infrastructure.
However, the lack of central management entity causes many
challenge for these networks in message routing, QoS and
security [30]. That is why solutions in ad-hoc networks are
based on cooperative and distributed architecture and the same
can be said for VANETs. Establishing trust between nodes
cannot rely on a central authority for authentication, key
exchange or certification [7]. So it is clear that decentralization
is one of the most important characteristics, yet it poses a
challenge for researchers to apply security and trust models.
B. The authenticity of information
It is very important to insure that messages are authentic
because some of this information is used in making life and
death decisions. The integrity of messages broadcasted in
VANET must be checked by linking them to an authenticated
(trusted) source to avoid identity attacks like the Sybil attack
[1]. However some user information is private and should be
kept that way, which introduces a challenge for trusting authen-
ticated users while keeping their identity anonymous. Linking
a user to an identity is very important for forensic evidence as
highlighted by [1]. But it is vital that this information should
be Limited to government and law enforcement agencies.
Some solutions don’t require knowledge of the identity to
authenticate certain messages and can verify the integrity of
the message based on its contents [4].
C. Real-time processing
The success of VANET relies on the availability of in-
formation in Real-time, so any interruption or delay in the
delivery might affect the validity and the usage of the message.
VANET should follow strict security requirements to ensure
the privacy, confidentiality, non-repudiation while guaranteeing
the integrity of the message delivered in real-time [2]. These
networks are delay intolerant which makes the availability and
trust worthiness of other nodes to carry the message across
crucial for safety applications [20].
D. Highly Dynamic Topology
VANET consists of fast mobile vehicles in pre-determined
paths (roads). According to [5], when vehicles travel in high-
ways with an average speed of 60 mph they only come in
contact with other nodes for a very short time (5 Seconds).
This makes the network topology very dynamic with nodes
entering and leaving the network rapidly. This is a challenge
for trust management since nodes have to make fast decisions
with as little information as possible. The rapid mobility will
also cause frequent network outage for vehicles traveling in
remote areas [8]. The frequent changes in topology require
solutions that do not involve prior knowledge of the other node
and only examine the message carried across.
E. Routing
Message routing in ad-hoc networks rely on cooperation
between nodes in the absence of central routing infrastruc-
ture. Fen and Wang [5] argues that high-speed and patterned
mobility should be taken in consideration when designing
a routing protocol for VANETs. Because unlike MANETs,
a node cannot be expected to keep a routing table due
to the highly dynamic nature of the network. The most
well researched routing protocols inherited from MANET
are proactive and reactive protocols [15]. Routing protocols
in VANET can be further broken down in six categories:
Position-based, Topology-based, Geocast-based, Broadcast-
based, Cluster-based and Infrastructure-based [5] [10]. Most
researchers recommend the use of position based and geo-
casting [15] for security and performance reasons but it all
depends on the specific case in VANET.
F. Privacy
It is important to ensure that messages in VANET are not
intercepted or modified by malicious hackers. Information such
as the name, address of the driver and their locations’ history
is considered private. A successful solution should be able to
address security while preserving the privacy of the drivers
and their passengers [6]. The biggest challenge for drivers
is to make decisions based on information they receive from
vehicles they have no prior knowledge or experience with.
IV. TRUST MANAGEMENT IN VANET
VANETs core operations are based on cooperation
between nodes to relay messages through their neighbours.
Generally, nodes are cooperative, but certain nodes will
require some kind of incentive to cooperate, this might be
because they have limited resources, or they are selfish. If
nodes can’t guarantee the delivery of their messages by a
certain neighbour, they might refuse to trust him and to
cooperate with him in the future. Existing trust models in
VANETs can be broken down into three categories based on
the source of information [7] [8]: - Direct trust: This type of
trust is based on direct knowledge of the other node from
previous encounters.
- Indirect trust: This is based on information received from
other directly trusted nodes. So trust can be seen as a transitive
attribute.
- Hybrid: This combines information locally stored with trust
information exchanged with other nodes.
A. Trust-based Routing Protocols
Since routing is the most important aspect of operations
in VANET, some trust solutions are built on top of rout-
ing protocols. One of the secure routing approaches is the
CONFIDANT protocol [16], where the authors introduce the
watchdog and pathrater mechanisms for routing in mobile ad
hoc networks. The watchdog is a monitoring service, which
calculate the reputation of each node based on its cooperation
in the routing. The pathrater is a route selection mechanism,
which uses the reputation as a metric in the route selection, so
only trusted and cooperating nodes will be used for routing.
Since CONFIDANT was designed for classic ad-hoc networks
it has some limitations when applied to VANETs. One being
that it does not scale to very large and dynamic networks like
VANETs, and It does not address the frequent packet drops
caused by changes in topology as experienced in VANETs.
SAODV is another secured routing protocol for ad hoc
networks [19], it is based on AODV (AD-Hoc On demand Dis-
tance Vector). This protocol uses a public key infrastructure,
and uses the digital signature to ensure messages’ integrity.
Just like AODV, SOADV suffers from large packet overhead
which increases significantly with mobility. The overhead is
also increased when using asymmetric cryptography which can
lead to DoS in low resources nodes [17]. But, since power
and storage are not a major concern in VANETs, SAODV
is a promising trust solution. The Road Side Units (RSU)
can be used as a central trusted system for key management.
Nevertheless this will be always limited to areas where RSU is
present. Another drawback of public key infrastructure is that
the identity of nodes can no longer be kept private.
Adnane et al. [4] present a trust-based version of the OLSR
protocol (Optimised Link State Routing Protocol). They show
how trust-based reasoning can allow each node to evaluate the
behavior of the other nodes, and to check the consistency of the
routing information. In fact, each node uses a number of rules
to verify the validity of the network topology by correlating
all the received information from the network. This protocol
doesn’t generate an extra overhead to the network compared
to the basic OLSR protocol, but applying the trust rules and
verifying the consistency of all messages will require more
time from each node, which might be a problem in VANET.
When compared to AODV, OLSR generates more overhead,
However OLSR protocol has a lowest delay in high mobility
scenarios, this may be explained by the fact that OLSR is a
proactive protocol [21], [22].
B. Trust models for VANETs
The authors in [7] and [20] have categorised trust models
in the literature in three main categories: Entity-oriented, Data-
oriented and combined or hybrid trust models. We agree with
their categorization as it clearly groups the models in a logical
manner according to how trust calculations are performed.
Entity oriented trust is also referred to as direct trust which
is based on information about the identity (node). While Data-
oriented trust models focuses more on evaluating the content of
the message to make the trust decision. Finally, the combined
trust models are based on direct observations and on the other
peers recommendations.
a) Entity-oriented Trust models: : in this category,
models define trust as a combination of multiple factors about
the entity. For example, Gerlach proposed a social trust model
which uses calculations based on the principles of trust and
confidence tagging, the overall trust value of certain node is
calculated from the data available about the current specific
situation (called situational trust), combined with the node’s
own belief (called dispositional trust) and the system in which
the two nodes reside (called system trust). One of the draw-
backs is that the author did not provide information on how
the different types of trust are combined in the architecture.
Minahs et.al proposed another expanded trust model based
on the node’s roles and reputation [24]. In fact, their model
combines role-based trust, experience-based trust, majority-
based trust and priority-based trust. Role-based trust is de-
rived from predefined roles while experience-based trust is
calculated from direct interactions. Majority trust is formed
based on opinions gathered from selected advisors. Priority-
based trust is the value given based on the source of the trust
information. One drawback with this model is that it relies
on public key cryptography to determine role based trust (i.e.
the role of the node is taken from the provided certificate). It
requires a certificate authority to manage and validate keys.
While, the above two models have some common aspects, the
model in [24] is more valid for VANET as it has the ability to
incorporate the time and location of the source node and has
a majority agreed value for each node.
b) Data-oriented Trust models: : This type deals more
with the trustworthiness of the data received from other nodes
rather than the nodes themselves . Two examples of such
models can be found in Raya et.al [25] and Golle et .al [26].
Both models are based on the fact that associations between
nodes in VANETs are ”short-lived” and take place in ”volatile”
environments. Raya et.al argued that the identity of the node
in VANETs is irrelevant compared to the received informa-
tion such as traffic conditions updates and safety warnings
citeRaya2008. The model uses Bayesian inference (data fusion
technique) and Dempster-Shafer Theory (evidence evaluation
inspired by human reasoning) to evaluate the probability of an
event taking place in a particular time and context. The model
uses various evidences to calculate the probability of an event
being correct in a particular time, location and context. The
drawback in this proposal is that trust is purely based on events
and it needs to be established every time an event or message is
received from an entity regardless of any prior interaction with
that entity. Another drawback is that it requires the evaluation
of certain information (evidences) which could be tampered
with or unavailable when needed.
In [26], Golle et.al took the approach of giving a score
to each piece of data based on explanations gathered by a
local agent. The local information agent resides at every node
and contains the node’s knowledge of the VANET. When
information is received the agent evaluates it against what
is already known. The agents have sensors that apply the
basic rules of physics and statistical properties of events. For
example (two nodes can never occupy one location at the
same time) and (nodes rarely travel faster than 100 mph. This
model also provides attack detection techniques especially for
sophisticated attacks such as the ”Sybil attack”. This gives the
model an advantage on VANET over the model proposed by
Raya et .al [25]. The drawback in this model is the assumption
that each node has a global knowledge of the network which
in practise is not feasible. But if we assume that road side
units can be trusted to have this type of knowledge then, this
solution would be very applicable.
c) Combined Trust Models: : this type of trust models
combine the trustworthiness of the nodes and the reliability
of data presented. Dotzer et.al [27] proposed a reputation
model inspired by the idea of ”Opinion Piggybacking” (each
node adds its own opinion about the message). Their proposed
algorithm allows nodes to generate their own opinion on the
message based on the collected data from previous hops. A
node can have direct trust on other nodes from previous en-
counters or use other’s opinions to formulate new trust values.
When a new node first enters the network it can evaluate
trust based on the actual message and not the source which
makes feedback from others useful. Trust is dynamic and
uses the geo-location of the reporting node and the timestamp
on the message. The model also incorporates information
about the surrounding environment in the network and the
context in which the message was created. The shortcoming
in this approach is that it is vulnerable to collision between
nodes to affect the reputation system. In the model presented
by Patwardhan et.al [28] trust is calculated based on node
reputation and message data validation. The trustworthiness
of previously unknown node is based on a value provided by
trusted ”anchor nodes” which have well established identities
in the network. This model has the ability to validate message
content by examining multiple factors such as: the location, the
source of the message and the proxy providing it. A message
validation algorithm is used to detect any malicious nodes. One
of the drawbacks of reputation based models is that they rely
on the existence of other peers that have enough knowledge
and can be trusted. VANETs could make use of RSUs to be the
trusted anchor nodes. But, If they do not exist than it becomes
harder to calculate the trust based only the content of the
message. Another model was proposed by Sahoo et.al [29] for
secure VANETs routing inspired from Ant Colony. The model
proposed an algorithm for clustering nodes in a VANET and
choosing a cluster head that facilitates the routing process.
When a source node (S) would like to send a message to a
destination (D) within the cluster it first start by contacting
the cluster head (CH). The cluster head calculates indirect-
trust taken value from nodes within range and adds that to the
direct-trust or knowledge of the source. The disadvantages of
this proposal is that it assumes that nodes should be traveling
in the same direction to form a cluster and the process for
choosing a cluster head is time consuming.
To conclude this section, all these solutions designed par-
ticularly for VANET don’t cover all the security requirements.
This gives good opportunity for further research in the area,
and a good starting point would be to understand all the
advantages and flaws of the current solutions and evaluates
them with a benchmark.
V. EVALUATION CRITERIAS FOR THE TRUST MODELS
The above trust models have different approaches to ad-
dress common ad-hoc characteristics in VANETs. The main
requirements in VANETs are the integrity of information and
cooperation between nodes to route messages. This paper
proposes the following list as criteria for evaluating affective
trust management solutions in VANETs which is combined
from [7], [8], [17] and [20]:
A. Decentralization
Trust management solutions should be distributed among
nodes without the need for a central entity. The lack of infras-
tructure means that centralized solutions have less chance of
being successful. Conventional cryptographic solutions require
a central entity for key management such as a certificate
authority (CA). To solve this we need a distributed key man-
agement solutions such as ”Threshold Cryptography” which
was proposed by Adil Shamir of (RSA) [8]. The concept of
threshold cryptography is to share the secret key between n’
entities with t’ entities required to put together the secret key.
This will solve the need for a central trust management entity
but might not be practical for VANETs as there will not always
be t parties present. The solutions proposed in [24], [25] and
[28] do not require a central entity for trust management while
[23] and [29] makes use of RSUs as a central administration
entity. Since both approaches have their pros and cons, the best
solutions is to have a dynamic key management solution that
can toggle between both threshold cryptography and central
PKI.
B. Adaptive to rapid network Changes (topology)
Vehicles travel relatively in high speeds making VANET
topology very dynamic as links are dropped and new links
are established. Nodes should not be expected to save trust
association with other nodes for a very long time. Models in
[25], [27] and [28] consider the short lived association between
nodes and make their decisions on information rather than
the entities delivering them. While other solutions came short
when addressing this issue. The best solution would be to adapt
rapidly to network changes and do not require prior knowledge
of the network and its nodes.
C. Minimal Information to make a decision
In many cases there are very few vehicles in a VANET
and a node may have no prior knowledge on any of the other
nodes. Trust establishment mechanisms should be very quick
and require little knowledge of the network to make a decision.
Pure entity based models such as [23] and [24] are not very
useful in these circumstances. The best solution to this would
be like the models proposed in [26] and [29] where the trust
decision is entirely based on the situation or context. While
reputation based models such as [27] and [28] also have the
disadvantage of requiring information from others who might
not be always present. A good solution should consider very
minimal input to make a trust decision and adjust the score as
more information exist.
D. Scalability
In many ad-hoc networks there is no pre-set limitation on
the number of nodes that can join the network as always is the
case in VANETs. The trust solution should not be limited to a
small number of nodes and should have the ability to expand
to larger networks. Big networks pose the challenge of the
enormous amount of information received from many sources
in which the node is required to make a quick decision. Only
few of the above models address scalability in their design.
In the model proposed by Minhas et.al [24], a node has the
ability to fix the number of peers to exchange trust related
information. Dynamic Transmission Range is proposed in [29],
where vehicles can adjust their wireless connectivity range to
reduce the work load and preserve bandwidth (e.g. in case of
traffic congestion). An ideal solution should be able to adapt
to small and large networks.
E. Privacy
The biggest dilemmas in VANETs are how to trust infor-
mation from unknown sources while keeping driver identity
anonymous. Information stored and processed in vehicles
include the name of the driver/s, their travel history and
their permanent home address. This information should not be
shared with others. Among the above solutions, [24] and [27]
mentioned privacy briefly but did not specify exact measures.
The models in [23] and [26] proposed algorithms that filter user
sensitive information and prevents their exposure to others. The
identity of the node in data-based solutions is irrelevant giving
them a slight advantage over other solutions in this area.
F. Robustness/Security (against known attacks)
Ad-hoc networks are exposed to a wide range of malicious
attacks that could obstruct the entire operations of the network.
Robustness refers to the system’s ability to stand different
type of attacks. Models that rely on node reputation from
others are more vulnerable to collision attacks where more
than two nodes ”bad mouth” other nodes [7]. Other models
maybe vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks such as the
Sybil attack and Illusion attacks [2]. Unfortunately most of
the models examined did not address robustness except [26]
and [29]. A good trust model should be tested against most
frequent attacks (e.g. Sybil and Black hole).
G. Real-time processing
Trust models should have the ability to process informa-
tion in real-time because VANETs require making very fast
decisions. Trust management fail when the time required for
making a decision is larger than the total encounter time
with the other node which is usually very short. Some of the
above models use time-stamps to validate the integrity of the
message especially when the source is previously unknown
[24], [25] and [27]. We need to remember that VANETs are
delay intolerant networks and trust solutions should take this
in consideration.
H. Realistic
Most researchers in ad-hoc networks proof their theories
and models through simulation. Vehicular network Simulators
can present packet level simulation of a VANET. But they
require many mobility models and are always limited in
the number of nodes and simulation runs [30]. This makes
simulations limited compared to real vehicular test beds. The
models presented in this paper all obtained their findings from
simulation runs with limited mobility models. Furthermore,
some of the assumptions made by the researchers results
in the models not feasible for real road scenarios such as
the assumption that anchor nodes are always present in [28]
and the assumption that a node has global knowledge of the
network in [25].
I. Low Network Overhead
Bandwidth in wireless networks is limited by default.
Solutions to secure ad-hoc networks must have a low packet
overhead. Some of the models described above use public key
infrastructure which introduces large overhead to the network
[19], [24] and [28]. Network overhead can also be caused by
continuous routing and security updates as in [16], [27] and
[29]. Solutions should aim for the lowest overhead possible by
reducing the amount of data exchanged with neighbours.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper highlights the characteristics of VANETs in-
herited from conventional ad-hoc networks and others that
are specific to vehicular networks. Successful operations of
these networks rely heavily on collaboration between nodes
which require trust and incentive. We covered the issue of trust
management as one of the challenging security concerns as
presented in the literature. We introduced the concept of trust in
multiagent systems and how it has evolved in ad-hoc networks
as a solution to many of the security concerns. Multiple trust
solutions designed for VANETs were surveyed and critically
described in details. The contribution of the paper is in the
evaluation criteria for trust management solutions in VANETs.
These criteria aim to set some baselines for researchers who
wish to address the challenges of trust between vehicular
nodes. They represent the collective efforts of several research
papers in a single resource with an in-depth analysis of each
category. A possible future work would be to look at potential
improvements in some of the current trust models based on
the evaluation criteria presented.
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